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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to develop a methodology for thorough empirical testing of major 
contemporary corporate risk management theories: financial theory, agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and new institutional economics. Unlike in previous research, the tests are 
organised around theories, rather than individual hypotheses. I used a number of tests for 
robustness and subjected hypotheses to repeated testing, cross-verifying results. Evidence of 
tests conducted on a sample of 150 companies listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 
Poland, covering years from 2001 to 2005, clearly point to low empirical verification of all 
theories considered. However, I find evidence for some theoretical determinants: currency 
exposure, market-to-book value, IT and service sectors and size. In conclusion I suggest 
implications for future empirical and conceptual research. 
Keywords: corporate risk management, hedging, derivatives, CART
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Risk Management Theory: A comprehensive empirical assessment
Working Paper
There have been many empirical studies aiming at finding support for the various 
theories of corporate financial risk management. However, subsequent research papers failed 
to determine which theories are supported by the data and which are not. In consequence both 
theoretical research efforts and the design of applied methods for corporate risk management 
are stalled by the inability to decide which theoretical approach to follow. After a spate of 
new research in this field in the late 90's there have been few studies that added to our 
understanding of corporate hedging behaviour. Incidentally, most valuable pieces of research 
in recent years concentrated on methodological issues: the endogeneity problem (Jin and 
Jorion, 2006), inclusion of non-derivative hedging (Davies et al., 2006; Judge, 2006), and 
assumptions about the purpose of derivative use (Faulkender, 2005). In this paper I follow the 
methodological strain of research and propose verification of risk management theory which 
is focused not on individual hypotheses but on theories. I also attempt to provide strong 
evidence as to the verification status of these theories by using a number of methods and 
subjecting hypotheses to repeated testing. 
This paper aims to design and conduct an exhaustive empirical investigation into all 
major corporate risk management theories, which would provide strong statement of their 
verification status. The theories considered include risk management models developed 
within the body of the following theories of the firm: financial theory, agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and new institutional economics. Consequently, while most research 
papers present the hypotheses in sections concentrated around particular determinants of risk 
management, I discuss them in the order of theories from which they originated. 
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The inclusion of new institutional economics and stakeholder theory, none of which 
has been tested in the context of risk management, is the first attempt to introduce these 
theories to empirical research in the field. Both theories are relatively new and immature. 
However, since they offer a new perspective on the problem of hedging, it is worthwhile to 
consider them. 
Another contribution of this paper is a cohesive testing methodology. First of all, I 
designed a set of hypotheses basing on previous research. Secondly, despite using a new 
approach to empirical verification, I strived to maintain comparability with previous studies 
in terms of hypotheses and statistical methods. Thirdly, I tested hypotheses using a wide 
range of statistical methods, with repeated testing of the same hypothesis, which provided 
double verification of results. These issues are discussed in the section on methodology 
below. 
The choice of data also provides a new insight into risk management practices of 
companies. The dataset for this study comprises annual report data for 150 Polish listed 
companies, in the period of 2001-2005.  Few studies of economic theories are carried out 
using emerging market data. In the period examined Polish companies had ready access to 
derivatives and were subject to International Accounting Standard 32 and 39 regulation. 
However only 30% used hedging, far fewer than in developed European or overseas markets. 
It is therefore interesting to investigate this new market and check if research results match 
those from different markets.
Theories and previous research
Financial economics approach
Financial economics approach to corporate risk management has so far been the most 
prolific in terms of both theoretical model extensions and empirical research. This approach 
builds upon classic Modigliani-Miller paradigm (Miller and Modigliani, 1958) which states 
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conditions for irrelevance of financial structure for corporate value. This paradigm was later 
extended to the field of risk management. This approach stipulates also that hedging leads to 
lower volatility of cash flow and therefore lower volatility of firm value. Rationales for 
corporate risk management were deduced from the irrelevance conditions and included: 
higher debt capacity (Miller and Modigliani, 1963), progressive tax rates, lower expected 
costs of bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz, 1985), securing internal financing (Froot et al., 1993), 
information asymmetries (Geczy et al., 1997) and comparative advantage in information 
(Stulz, 1996). The ultimate result of hedging, if it indeed is beneficial to the firm, should be 
higher value – a hedging premium. 
Evidence to support the predictions of financial economics theory approach to risk 
management is poor. Although risk management does lead to lower variability of corporate 
value (e.g. Jin and Jorion, 2006), which is the main prerequisite for all other effects, there 
seems to be little proof of this being linked with benefits specified by the theory. One of the 
most widely cited papers by Tufano (1996) finds no evidence to support financial hypotheses, 
and concentrates on the influence of managerial preferences instead. On the other hand, the 
higher debt capacity hypothesis seems to be verified positively, as shown by Faff and Nguyen 
(2002), Graham and Rogers (2002) and Guay (1999). Internal financing hypothesis was 
positively verified by Guay (1999) and Geczy et al. (1997), while it was rejected by Faff and 
Guyen (2002) and Mian (1996). Judge (2006) found evidence in support of financial distress 
hypothesis. Tax hypothesis was verified positively by Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), 
while other studies verified it negatively (Mian, 1996 ; Graham and Rogers, 2002). More 
recently Jin and Jorion (2006) provide strong evidence of lack of value relevance of hedging, 
although some previous studies have identified a hedging premium (Allayannis and Weston, 
2001, Carter et al., 2006). 
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The hypotheses tested in this study include all of the above rationales, except for 
information asymmetries and comparative information advantage. The first two hypothesis 
test the underlying assumption, that hedging leads to lower volatility of company value.
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between hedging and stock price volatility.
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between hedging a particular risk and stock 
price exposure to that risk factor.
The next hypothesis tests for a hedging premium by looking at companies that start 
hedging, rather than a cross-section of hedgers vs. non-hedgers, following the approach of 
Guay (1999). 
Hypothesis 1c: Firms that begin hedging experience a rise in market value of equity.
According to debt capacity and tax incentive rationales, firms should be interested in 
raising their gearing ratios, using the tax shield to the full extent, and lowering their tax 
charges. Hedging facilitates this by lowering risk of default and allowing higher debt 
capacity. Lower volatility of earnings may also result in lower average tax charges if the tax 
curve is concave, however in Poland corporate income tax is flat-rate so this effect is not 
important. 
Hypothesis 1d: There is a positive relationship between hedging and debt/equity ratio.
Hypothesis 1e: Firms that begin hedging, raise their debt equity ratio subsequently.
Hypothesis 1f: Firms with low times interest earned ratio (EBIT/interest paid), but above 
one, hedge more often than either firms with high ratio or lower than one. 
Hypothesis 1g: Firms that hedge are able to pay their interest charges (times interest earned 
ratio > 1).
Hypothesis 2h: There is a negative relationship between hedging and income tax paid 
(relative to sales).
Hypothesis 2i: Average tax charge falls after firms start to hedge.
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The final hypothesis of financial economics is linked to securing internal financing for 
important strategic projects and lowering costs of financial distress. These incentives should 
be more important to companies with high development expenditure or other growth options.
Hypothesis 2j: There is a positive relationship between hedging and growth options,  
represented by high R&D expenditure or high market-to-book value ratio.
Agency theory
Agency theory extends the analysis of the firm to include separation of ownership and 
control, and managerial motivation. In the field of corporate risk management agency issues 
have been shown to influence managerial attitudes toward risk taking and hedging (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985). Theory also explains a possible mismatch of interest between shareholders, 
management and debt holders due to asymmetries in earning distribution, which can result in 
the firm taking too much risk or not engaging in positive net value projects (Mayers and 
Smith, 1987). Consequently, agency theory implies that defined hedging policies can have 
important influence on firm value (Fite and Pfleiderer, 1995). The latter hypotheses are 
associated with financing structure, and give predictions similar to financial theory.
Managerial motivation factors in implementation of corporate risk management have 
been empirically investigated in a few studies with a negative effect (Faff and Nguyen, 2002; 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Geczy et al., 1997). Notably, positive evidence was found 
however by Tufano (1996) in his analysis of the gold mining industry in the US. Financial 
policy hypotheses were tested in studies of the financial theory, since both theories give 
similar predictions in this respect. All in all, the bulk of empirical evidence seems to be 
against agency theory hypotheses however. 
Agency theory provides strong support for hedging as a response to mismatch 
between menagerial incentives and shareholder interests. The following hypotheses are 
designed to test the basic implications of this theory. The first hypothesis tests if firms hedge 
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in order to decrease risk to block shareholders. The next three hypotheses address the 
question of hedging as a tool to safeguard debtholder interest and thus increase debt capacity. 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations I was unable to test managerial option and stock 
holding hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between hedging and individual block  
ownership.
Hypothesis 2b: Hedging is used most often by companies with high debt/equity ratios.
Hypothesis 2c: Firms start hedging more often if they have low equity/assets ratios and wish 
to issue debt or take out a bank loan.
Hypothesis 2d: Firms start hedging more often if they have high debt/equity ratios and wish 
to issue debt or take out a bank loan.
New Institutional Economics
A different perspective on risk management is offered by new institutional economics. 
The focus is shifted here to governance processes and socio-economic institutions that guide 
these processes, as explained by Williamson (1998). Although no empirical studies of new 
institutional economics approach to risk management have been carried out so far, the theory 
offers an alternative explanation of corporate behavior. Namely, it predicts that risk 
management practices may be determined by institutions or accepted practice within a market 
or industry. Moreover, the theory links security with specific assets purchase (Williamson, 
1987), which implies that risk management can be important in contracts which bind two 
sides without allowing diversification, such as large financing contract or close cooperation 
within a supply chain.
If institutional factors do play an important role in hedging, this should be observable 
in the data. First of all, there may be a difference between sectors. Secondly, hedging may be 
more popular in certain periods – in Poland one might venture a guess, that hedging should 
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become more popular with years. A more concrete implication of this theory, is that 
shareholders may be interested in attracting block ownership by reducing company risk. Here 
NIE is similar in its predictions to agency theory. However this theory also suggest that firm 
practices may be influenced by the ownership structure in general. These implications are 
tested with the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a. There are differences in popularity of hedging between industries.
Hypothesis 3b: The frequency of hedging changes with time.
Hypothesis 3c: Hedging is positively related to individual block onwership.
Hypothesis 3d: Hedging behaviour is influenced by the ownership structure: the government,  
institutional investors, foreign investors.
Stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory, developed originally by Freeman (1984) as a managerial 
instrument, has since evolved into a theory of the firm with high explanatory potential. 
Stakeholder theory focuses explicitly on an equilibrium of stakeholder interests as the main 
determinant of corporate policy. The most promising contribution to risk management is the 
extension of implicit contracts theory from employment to other contracts, including sales 
and financing (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). In certain industries, particularly high-tech and 
services, consumer trust in the company being able to continue offering its services in the 
future can substantially contribute to company value. However, the value of these implicit 
claims is highly sensitive to expected costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. Since 
corporate risk management practices lead to a decrease in these expected costs, company 
value rises (Klimczak, 2005). Therefore stakeholder theory provides a new insight into 
possible rationale for risk management. However, it has not yet been tested directly. 
Investigations of financial distress hypothesis (Smith and Stulz, 1995)  provide only indirect 
evidence (e.g. Judge, 2006).
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I have designed the following hypotheses to test for the usefulness of this theory in 
risk management research. The first hypothesis addresses the importance of customer trust 
and resulting potentially high costs of financial distress in IT and service sectors. The second 
hypothesis also looks at financial distress costs, but in a general manner – companies with 
high intangible or human assets, and growth options are more sensitive to continuity 
problems. This is essentially the same as hypothesis 1j of financial economics. And finally, 
smaller firms are more prone to financial problems, which should increase their interest in 
risk management practices. The last hypothesis is however in clear contrast to all previous 
empirical evidence. 
Hypothesis 4a: Hedging is more popular among firms form IT and service sectors.
Hypothesis 4b: Companies with high market-to-book value hedge more.
Hypothesis 4c: Hedging is more common among smaller firms.
Methodology
Since evidence in support of various risk management theories remains mixed I found 
there is a need to design a study, which will bring these theories together and test them on a 
single sample using robust methodology. This approach allows comparison of theories and 
their assumptions and can provide better indication of possible ways to develop new 
theoretical models. The sections below explains in detail the study design issues.
Data
Analysis was conducted on a panel of Polish non-financial companies, listed at the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. The panel included data of some 150 companies (numbers for 
particular years varied slightly) for the period from 2001 to 2005. The last two years of the 
series were used for verification of results and data for this period was gathered from 30 
companies selected randomly. 
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The choice of Polish listed companies for theory verification requires a comment, 
since there may be concerns about possible idiosyncratic factors influencing risk management 
in Poland. All companies included in the study were based in Poland, their ownership 
structure notwithstanding. My position is that verifying risk management theory on data from 
a country which is still developing can yield results as reliable as studies based on richest 
country data. Firstly, Polish companies have for the past 17 years been rapidly learning new 
business models and techniques, including financial management. Since I have based my 
study on the assumption of rationality I am of the opinion that Polish companies based their 
decision to implement risk management on an educated judgement of pros and cons. 
Secondly, due to ongoing economic transition there are fewer historical and institutional 
determinants of the current state of risk management in Poland than there might be in the 
USA, UK, or Germany. Thirdly, sufficient financial market infrastructure does exist in 
Poland for companies to engage in risk management. Consequently, Polish companies can 
implement financial risk management processes provided they find them useful. 
The sample was further limited to include only non-financial corporations, that is 
companies from sectors other than financial services. This approach, adopted by Nance et al. 
(1993), Faff and Nguyen (2002) and Berkman and Bradbury (1996) is based on the premise 
that banks, insurance companies and other financial sector enterprises purchase and issue 
derivative instruments not only for hedging but also for trading purposes. Since both in these 
and in my study derivative instruments use is a proxy for hedging such companies had to be 
excluded from the sample. 
When it comes to data collection two alternative approaches to risk management 
research are present in the literature: use of annual report data and questionnaires. In this 
study I selected the former option. Although it limits the selection of variables to the contents 
of official filings, data gathered using this approach are more reliable as they have been 
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prepared using transparent rules specified by regulation. In the case of Poland a new law 
based on IAS 39 was introduced in 2001, which regulated the disclosure of financial 
instruments, including hedging. Hence, the beginning of the series was set for the first reports 
prepared according to that regulation. 
After reviewing variable distribution in the sample two largest companies were 
excluded as outliers. These were Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., the largest telecom provider, 
and PKN Orlen S.A., the largest oil refinement and distribution company. Both companies 
where incomparably larger than other companies in the sample and could not be analysed 
together with the rest of the market. Although both of them used hedging extensively, they 
would have to be analysed in a sample of large European companies, rather than Polish ones. 
Variables
Choice of dependant variable for risk managements studies poses an important 
methodological problem: in this study I used a binary hedging proxy. I inspected manually 
annual reports of sample companies to determine whether a company used derivative 
instruments. If a company did disclose derivatives and did not state that they were used for 
speculation, I classified it as a hedger. This construction of the hedging variable is of course 
subject to justified criticism. Jin and Jorion (2006) suggest using delta measures, while 
Faulkender (2005) stresses the importance of first determining what derivatives are used for. 
Other authors point to the significance of non-derivative hedging (Judge 2006). Nevertheless 
the binary proxy method has appeared most often in risk management research for practical 
reasons. I decided to use this approach firstly to maintain comparability with previous 
research, and secondly, because it was impossible to determine objectively, basing on annual 
reports, what was the purpose of derivative use, as Polish companies refrain from using hedge 
accounting due to cumbersome regulatory requirements.
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A detailed description of variables is show in Table 1. Exposure indicators were 
calculated for EUR/PLN, USD/PLN exchange rates and for WIBOR, EUR LIBOR, and USD 
LIBOR as betas in a CAPM style rates of return regression, following common practice in the 
field (e.g. Choi and Prasad, 1995; Bradley and Moles, 2001; Chen and So, 2002; Crabb, 
2002). They were later changed to absolute values, as I was interested in the extent, not the 
direction of exposure. Sales revenue was used as a scaling variable, since all previous studies 
showed size to be a strong determinant of risk management practices. Industry coding was 
done in accordance with the general nomenclature of the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
Table 1. Description of variables
Symbol Name Symbol Name
CURR Total foreign currency denominated assets and 
liabilities
investF Share of large foreign shareholders in equity (5% and above)
EQASS Equity/Total assets ratio investGov Government's share in equity if above 5%.
expEIR Exposure to euro Libor 3M interest rate investInd Share of block individual shareholders in equity (5% and 
above)
expEUR Exposure to EUR/PLN exchange rate investInst Share of large institutional investors in equity (5% and above)
expUIR Exposure to USD Libor 3M interest rate isssueE Cash inflow from issued equity
expUSD Exposure to USD/PLN exchange rate issueD Cash inflow from issued debt
expWIR Exposure to PLN Wibor 3M interest rate issueL Cash inflow from new loans
GEAR Gearing - Debt/Equity ratio MTBV Market-to-book value of equity
GEAR_INT Interest bearing gearing = Interest bearing 
debt/equity ratio 
MV Market Value of Equity
goalH Binary variable set to TRUE if firm stated 
hedging as the goal of derivative trading
RD R&D Expenditure - Cost of finished R&D projects
H Binary hedging variable, set to TRUE if company 
disclosed derivative instruments
riskComm Binary variable set to TRUE if company used commodity 
derivatives
INDUSTRY Coded as: construction, chemical, timber 
products, machinery, energy, trade, IT, media, 
metal, construction materials, manufacturing, 
food, telecom, services
riskFX Binary variable set to TRUE if company used currency 
derivatives
INTDEBT Total interest bearing debt as percentage of sales riskIR Binary variable set to TRUE if company used interest rate 
derivatives
TIE Times Interest Earned ratio TAX Corporate income tax as percentage of sales
SALES Revenue from sales – proxy for firm size. VOL Stock price volatility – standard deviation of weekly rates of 
return
Results
The data was analysed using a number of techniques. All of the analysis was 
performed in R statistics package. In the first step I carried out tests of means and medians, as 
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is usually done in other studies of this field. The comparison was done in two ways: 
statically, by comparing hedgers to non-hedgers, and dynamically, by comparing companies 
that started to hedge in a given year with companies that did not hedge. I then proceeded to 
Hotelling's tests for difference of vectors of means, ANOVA, logit regression, and CART 
analysis. The last method, CART analysis, is in essence a decision tree method for breaking a 
sample into two categories using a series of decision nodes. It has not yet become popular in 
financial research, but as I will show below it has a number of advantages. 
Table 2. Sample characteristics by year
YEAR
Variable Level 2001 2002 2003
H FALSE 92 (80%) 96 (70%) 110 (71%)
TRUE 23 (20%) 41 (30%) 45 (29%)
goalH FALSE 101 (88%) 112 (82%) 122 (79%)
TRUE 14 (12%) 25 (18%) 33 (21%)
riskFX FALSE 102 (89%) 111 (81%) 121 (78%)
TRUE 13 (11%) 26 (19%) 34 (22%)
riskIR FALSE 110 (96%) 127 (93%) 146 (94%)
TRUE 5 (4%) 10 (7%) 9 (6%)
riskComm FALSE 113 (98%) 134 (98%) 152 (98%)
TRUE 2 (2%) 3 (2%) 3 (2%)
INDUSTRY chemical 6 8 8
clothing 5 5 5
construction 20 21 21
construction materials 5 5 5
energy 2 2 3
food 13 15 15
IT 9 12 13
machinery 13 13 13
manufacturing 10 10 12
media 4 4 6
metal 10 12 13
other 1 1 1
pharmaceutical 1 1 1
services 2 3 4
telecom 7 7 8
timber products 6 6 6
trade 14 15 18
N 128 140 152
Univariate tests for the difference of means (table 3) indicated significant differences 
between hedgers and non-hedgers in size: hedgers tended to be larger both in terms of sales 
and market value of equity. This has been shown to be true in other markets by all previous 
studies and is a clear proof of barriers or strong economies of scale which must exist in 
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derivative hedging. However this result contradicts hypotheses 2a, 3c and 4c, all of which 
imply that smaller, more risky firms should benefit more from implementing hedging. Two 
other significant differences were in tax charges and individual block ownership. However, 
the sign in both cases was opposite to the predictions (hypotheses 1h, 2a and 3c). 
Comparisons of means between new hedgers and non-hedgers showed only two significant 
differences in the year 2002 for exposure to EUR/PLN exchange rates and WIBOR interest 
rate. In general tests in the dynamic approach provided widely varying results, both in terms 
of magnitude and sign.
Table 3. Test for the difference of means
Difference of means
hedgers vs. non-hedgers
Difference of means
new-hedgers vs. non-hedgers
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003
Variable t t t p p p t t p p
expEUR 0.0180 2.5834 -0.1537 0.9856 0.0113 0.8782 -2.2744 -0.9554 0.0259 0.3428
expUSD -0.5256 -0.6075 -1.3748 0.6004 0.5449 0.1721 -0.3277 -0.7700 0.7441 0.4440
expWIR -0.9926 1.0382 -1.1546 0.3233 0.3018 0.2508 -2.0848 0.6151 0.0406 0.5405
expEIR -0.8514 -0.7575 -0.1073 0.3966 0.4506 0.9148 -0.1885 0.3703 0.8510 0.7123
expUIR -0.9097 -0.8203 -0.6470 0.3652 0.4141 0.5190 0.1828 0.4755 0.8555 0.6359
VOL 0.6178 -1.0434 -3.4514 0.5382 0.2992 0.0008 0.6517 1.3707 0.5165 0.1746
MV 3.6763 4.5954 3.6292 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 -1.5783 0.6075 0.1191 0.5453
GEAR 0.9471 0.2956 0.1180 0.3457 0.7680 0.9063 -0.6371 0.9379 0.5257 0.3506
GEAR_INT -0.7300 1.1208 -0.8124 0.4678 0.2647 0.4180 -1.4435 0.3070 0.1543 0.7596
TIE 2.2236 0.8427 0.7208 0.0283 0.4009 0.4722 0.5877 -1.5730 0.5582 0.1190
TAX 2.0644 2.5592 1.4474 0.0413 0.0116 0.1500 -0.4571 -0.1017 0.6487 0.9192
SALES 3.1888 5.3829 4.8907 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2053 -1.7967 0.8378 0.0755
RD -0.4606 0.8245 -1.2929 0.6460 0.4111 0.1982 0.4636 0.3160 0.6441 0.7527
MTBV 1.1401 2.9285 1.5973 0.2573 0.0042 0.1127 0.0652 0.6282 0.9482 0.5318
investInd -1.5693 -2.1544 -2.2676 0.1205 0.0335 0.0251 1.4484 1.3164 0.1529 0.1927
investGov 0.2401 -0.6103 0.2115 0.8108 0.5430 0.8328 0.7881 -0.2448 0.4337 0.8073
investInst 0.0327 0.4377 0.7159 0.9740 0.6625 0.4755 -1.0437 -1.3402 0.3009 0.1848
investF -0.3465 1.6129 2.6686 0.7299 0.1097 0.0086 -1.6960 0.2546 0.0951 0.7998
EQASS -0.0198 0.7804 0.6153 0.9842 0.4365 0.5393 -0.7609 1.3627 0.4487 0.1761
INTDEBT -0.3724 1.1131 -0.6470 0.7107 0.2679 0.5187 -1.0659 0.3273 0.2909 0.7443
CURR 2.9863 0.8765 1.4949 0.0035 0.3823 0.1372 0.3259 0.2116 0.7453 0.8329
issueL 1.0551 -0.7811 0.7300 0.2937 0.4361 0.4666 0.7525 0.5594 0.4534 0.5772
issueD -0.5606 -0.4794 -0.6001 0.5762 0.6324 0.5494 0.4256 0.3648 0.6713 0.7160
issueA 2.0399 -0.4955 -1.3467 0.0438 0.6210 0.1802 0.8009 0.9947 0.4250 0.3223
In bold: p-values below 0.1 and variables with significant p-values in two subsequent years.
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Tests for the difference of medians (table 4) confirmed results of the previous test: 
size, tax charges and individual block holding were all significant again. However there were 
also other significant differences. Hedgers tended to have a higher median of foreign 
currency assets and liabilities, which would provide a clear reason for hedging. Moreover, 
they exhibited lower volatility of stock prices (hypothesis 1a) and higher market-to-book 
value (1j and 4b). Lower volatility is particularly important, as it shows that all other benefits 
arising form it can be attainable. Test of new hedgers vs. non-hedgers showed no significant 
differences here.
Table 4. Tests for the difference of medians.
Difference of Medians
hedgers vs. non-hedgers
Difference of Medians
new-hedgers vs. non-hedgers
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003
Variable W* W W p p p W W p p
expEUR 728 525.5 1150.5   0.3625   0.0000   0.4555 608.5 321   0.0025   0.4144 
expUSD 837.5 901 1342   0.7679   0.3201   0.2665 465 321   0.2946   0.3249 
expWIR 908 904.5 1370.5   0.2165   0.2632   0.1567 526 244   0.0235   0.5431 
expEIR 884 1028 1305   0.3646   0.6198   0.6920 431.5 236   0.6645   0.4502 
expUIR 840.5 980 1270   0.7116   1.0000   0.8148 394 250   0.9264   0.4882 
VOL 812 1390 1996   0.9066   0.0885   0.0002 432 210   0.6519   0.1456 
MV 435 519 988   0.0064   0.0000   0.0000 426 267   0.6265   0.5075 
GEAR 1046 1915 2450   0.6864   0.8059   0.9233 701 270   0.6673   0.1023 
GEAR_INT 437.5 1318 1929   0.4992   0.2467   0.4138 412 382.5   0.1171   0.1554 
TIE 935 1617 1846   1.0000   0.0996   0.1476 625 392   0.8220   0.8811 
TAX 675.5 1426 1993.5   0.0175   0.0105   0.3724 645 333   0.8396   0.3903 
SALES 693 789 1243   0.0250   0.0000   0.0000 765 444   0.3353   0.6447 
RD 1165 2299 3048   0.2376   0.1206   0.0177 786 316   0.2418   0.2866 
MTBV 454 773 1503   0.0135   0.0065   0.1980 419 251   0.6209   0.4278 
investInd 696 1613 2106   0.0802   0.0280   0.0083 197 138   0.0757   0.1310 
investGov 571 1398 1658   0.9875   0.4342   0.7300 286 220.5   0.2954   1.0000 
investInst 522 997 1421   0.7252   0.0557   0.2140 372.5 258   0.1323   0.3492 
investF 550 1041 1461   0.9060   0.0626   0.0399 350 244.5   0.1513   0.8151 
EQASS 1037 1917 2492   0.7352   0.8131   0.9483 699 247   0.6818   0.0543 
INTDEBT 405.5 1465 2118   0.8276   0.7545   0.9804 362 367.5   0.4910   0.2381 
CURR 712 1556 1915   0.0558   0.0760   0.2519 808 382   0.0852   0.8689 
issueL 880 1881 1852   0.4681   0.6846   0.1494 959 483   0.5931   0.4478 
issueD 1018 1713 1717   0.6752   0.0349   0.0007 970 391.5   0.3065   0.6526 
issueA 1011.5 1693.5 2351   0.7366   0.0521   0.3046 962 319.5   0.4088   0.1741 
*W stands for Mann-Whitney statistic. In bold: p-values below 0.1 and variables with significant p-
values in two subsequent years.
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Next, I tested for the multivariate difference of means using Hotelling's test for the 
difference of vectors of means. The logic behind this test is that while two groups may not 
exhibit strong differences in terms of individual factors, they may show differences in the 
combination of these factors. I first grouped hypotheses 1a, 1d, 1h and 1j of financial 
economics (which could be tested using this method), which produced a vector of means of 
following variables: volatility, gearing, tax charge, and market-to-book value. The statistic 
for years 2001-2003 was respectively 35.52, 74.08 and 86.30; in all cases much above the 5% 
confidence level mark of 10.048. Unfortunately one cannot tell from this result which factors 
were significant. By comparing this to univariate tests it can be seen that only the tax charge 
was significant, although with the wrong sign. Hypotheses 1c, 1e and 1i for the new-hedgers 
could not be tested using this method due to a singular covariance matrix. 
Hotelling's test also gave positive results for hypotheses 2a and 2b of agency theory, 
with a score of 24.99, 34.98 and 33.13. However in this case the significant factor was block 
holding, which had a sign opposite to the predictions. It is therefore hard to determine 
whether this result is reliable, especially since the difference for gearing was inconclusive 
both in significance and sign. 
Analysis of variance was a suitable method for testing hypotheses which required 
breaking the sample into more than two groups: hypotheses 1f, 1g, 2c, 2d, 3a-3d, and 4a. The 
first of these, hypothesis 1f, stated that hedging should be more popular among firms with 
low, but higher than one, times interest earned ratios. To test this, I divided the sample 
companies into three groups: ratio below one, ratio above one but below the median, and 
ratio above the median. There was however no significant difference between groups 
(F=1.5067 in 2001, 0.1588 in 2002 and 1.4844 in 2002). Hypothesis 1g stated that hedgers 
should be covering their interest expenses, so I assigned a dummy variable value 1 if this was 
true, and 0 if times interest earned ratio was below one. Results showed no significance, 
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except for 2002 at 8% level (F statistic for 2001-2003 was respectively: 0.0482, 3.1008, 
0.8608). 
Agency theory hypothesis 2c stated that companies motivated to hedging might be 
ones with low equity/total assets ratios which raise their gearing level subsequently. To test it 
I created two new variables: low equity/total asset ratio (split at the median) and rise in 
gearing (with two levels, 'increase' and 'decrease'). Results showed no significant differences 
for any of the factors or their interaction. The F statistic for 2002 ranged from 0.0341 to 
0.4130. For 2003 I had to use Kruskal-Wallis test due to heterogeneity of variances – the 
result was 0.9917 (insignificant). Another agency theory hypothesis, 2d, focused on 
companies with high gearing that look to increase their debt capacity. There was however no 
significant difference for either 2002 or 2003, both for debt/equity ratio calculated using total 
debt and only interest bearing debt. 
New institutional economics hypotheses concentrated on the role of trend, industry 
and ownership factors. Industry (3a) proved not to influence hedging, with F values of 
0.8049, 0.3308 and  0.5968 for 2001-2003 respectively. Pooling companies into larger, more 
general industry groups did not help. There was also no significant difference between the 
time periods, as hypothesis 3b suggested (F=1.8981). However, testing for influence of 
ownership structure on hedging and starting hedging did yield some significant results 
(hypotheses 3c and 3d, table 5). For this analysis I converted ownership information was into 
dummy variables taking value 1 if a particular group of owners was present. Heterogeneity of 
variances was detected in 2001 data, so I calculated Kruskal-Wallis statistic for this and the 
following years, and they gave significant results. F statistics were significant in all three 
years for individual block ownership, although this was mostly due to significant negative 
correlation of this variable with firm size. Institutional ownership produced significant restult 
in 2002. Results for new-hedgers were poorer, with individual block ownership significant at 
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8% level in 2003 only, and the interaction with government ownership at 7% confidence 
level. Government ownership was also significant at 9% level in 2002. The final ANOVA 
test was for hypothesis 4a of stakeholder theory, which pointed to IT and service sectors as 
potentially more interested in risk management. However no significant difference was 
detected (F statistic: 1.9153, 0.5122, 0.3625).
Table 5. ANOVA results for ownership structure determinants of hedging.
year
2001 2002 2003
st.* p st. p st. p
 Bartlett test 4,2168 0,0400 1,1952 0,2743 2,0040 0,1569
Kruskal-Wallis test 3,5919 0,0580 3,6511 0,0560 8,5951 0,0034
F-statistics:
Individual 3,4719 0,0668 4,0195 0,0478 8,9237 0,0035
Government 0,2493 0,6192 2,2245 0,1392 0,3859 0,5358
Institutional 0,0201 0,8876 9,4659 0,0027 1,0529 0,3072
Foreign 0,0916 0,7631 0,5606 0,4559 0,0128 0,9103
Individual:Government** 0,1317 0,7178 0,1563 0,6935 0,2445 0,6220
Individual:Institutional** 1,0797 0,3025 0,4764 0,4917 3,1740 0,0777
Government:Institutional** 0,8827 0,3508 1,4556 0,2307 0,0068 0,9346
Individual:Foreign** 0,3454 0,5587 0,5181 0,4734 0,3488 0,5561
Government:Foreign** 0,8037 0,3732 0,0119 0,9134 0,0053 0,9420
Institutional:Foreign** 0,6033 0,4400 2,9234 0,0906 0,3704 0,5440
* st. stands for 'statistic', **interactions
Logit regression has also been used in similar studies, which motivated me to employ 
it in my analysis. However I decided not to pool all the variables together in one regression 
model, but rather create separate models for different theories. I created one equation for 
hedgers vs. non-hedgers hypotheses and another for new-hedgers vs. non-hedgers hypotheses 
of all the theories. I estimated the equations separately for each of the three years to compare 
stability of results – all significant variables maintained their sign and coefficient values 
changed only slightly, while insignificant variable coefficients varied widely. Table 6 shows 
results for  equations estimated on 2002 data, which were consistently best in terms of 
significance, fit and  prediction accuracy. All attempts to model new-hedgers vs. non-hedgers 
produced insignificant results. Hence, I did not provide a detailed table of results. 
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Two equations failed to produce any significant results: agency theory model, where 
hedging was to be correlated with individual block ownership and gearing, and new 
institutional economics equation, which focused on shareholder structure. Whereas NEI 
hypotheses were tested only as a pilot study, agency theory results are important, as I 
obtained negative results also in previous tests. Surprisingly, stakeholder theory model had 
two significant variables – MTBV and SALES – although the overall fit was low, and 
prediction accuracy poor. A much better result was obtained by financial economics model, 
where three variables were significant: expEUR, expUSD and MTBV. Two variables had 
signs opposite to expected: exposure to USD/PLN had a negative sign (exposure variables 
were in absolute values), and income tax had a positive coefficient.
To compare my results with previous studies I finally pooled all the variables 
together. I obtained a good fit with high prediction accuracy. The singificant variables were: 
exposure to USD and EUR rates, volatility, MTBV, IT and Services sector and size (sales). 
Predictions were quite accurate: 67% and 70% of correct hits, with 36% and 41% of false 
positives. The number of false positives could be decreased, although at the expense of 
positive hits, by estimating an equation with only the significant variables (table 6). 
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Table 6. Logit regression results for hedgers vs. non-hedgers (ITS stands for IT and Services  
industries).
Financial economics hypotheses Agency theory hypotheses 
Variable Estimate z-value Pr(>|z|) Variable Estimate z-value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -1,7681 -2,0470 0,0407 * (Intercept) -0,6648 -1,7110 0,0870 '
VOL -12,1485 -0,9120 0,3615 investInd -1,5927 -1,9690 0,0489 *
expEUR 1,7732 2,7760 0,0055 ** GEAR_INT 0,8922 0,9140 0,3607
expUSD -3,4439 -2,4670 0,0136 * Log-Likelihood -64,7657
expWIR 6,5984 0,6040 0,5460 2001 2002 2003
GEAR_INT 0,8931 0,6620 0,5081 True Positives 69,23% 71,43% 71,79%
TAX 23,2262 1,1140 0,2654 False Positives 56,25% 56,34% 50,00%
MTBV 0,5539 2,0480 0,0406 *
Log-Likelihood -41,9079 New Institutional Economics hypotheses 
2001 2002 2003 Variable Estimate z-value Pr(>|z|)
True Positives 75,00% 81,48% 67,65% (Intercept) -0,4128 -1,0500 0,2938
False Positives 36,73% 16,95% 47,83% investInd -1,6343 -1,8270 0,0677 '
investGov -2,0121 -1,1530 0,2490
Stakeholder theory hypotheses investInst -0,2395 -0,2140 0,8304
Variable Estimate z-value Pr(>|z|) investF 0,7730 0,8810 0,3782
(Intercept) -2,3930 -5,5020 0,0000 *** Log-Likelihood -63,9055
ITS 0,6685 1,0210 0,3074 2001 2002 2003
MTBV 0,5463 2,5510 0,0108 * True Positives 58,82% 64,71% 56,41%
przychN 0,0000 3,3280 0,0009 *** False Positives 52,31% 45,95% 48,15%
Log-Likelihood -48,2389
2001 2002 2003 All variables 
True Positives 58,82% 64,71% 56,41% Variable Estimate z-value Pr(>|z|)
False Positives 52,31% 45,95% 48,15% (Intercept) -2,9200 -1,1650 0,2440
CURR 1,2700 0,9230 0,3562
Best fit with mixed variables expEUR 3,1410 2,3920 0,0168 *
Variable Estimate z-value Pr(>|z|) expUSD -5,6090 -2,2800 0,0226 *
(Intercept) -1,1870 -1,4830 0,1381 expWIR -3,9480 -0,1420 0,8871
przychN 0,0000 3,5720 0,0004 *** VOL -59,9000 -1,9050 0,0568 '
ITS 3,2000 2,6170 0,0089 ** GEAR_INT 0,2651 0,0770 0,9387
MTBV 0,3553 1,2400 0,2149 TAX 33,7300 0,8570 0,3917
VOL -47,1800 -2,3870 0,0170 * MTBV 1,7050 1,8650 0,0622 '
expEUR 1,3670 2,8860 0,0039 ** investInd -3,4780 -1,2970 0,1948
expUSD -3,2940 -2,4170 0,0157 * investGov -2,3950 -0,6300 0,5285
Log-Likelihood -34,1579 EQASS 0,2696 0,0810 0,9352
2001 2002 2003 ITS 4,3300 1,8250 0,0679 '
True Positives 40,00% 71,43% 52,94% SALES 0,0000 2,9810 0,0029 **
False Positives 21,43% 19,12% 29,17% Log-Likelihood -17,5962
2001 2002 2003
True Positives 66,67% 84,62% 70,00%
False Positives 35,90% 12,00% 40,74%
The final method I used was the classification and regression trees (CART) algorithm 
for determining which of the factors suggested by theory provide best criteria for 
distinguishing hedgers from non-hedgers. This method, developed originally by Breiman et 
al. (1984), is an algorithm which produces a decision tree consisting of a hierarchy of criteria 
for splitting a sample into two groups. In the case of risk management CART models provide 
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a non-linear method for distinguishing hedgers from non-hedgers. It allows not only for non-
linearity of relationships but also non-linearity of variables, sub-sample heterogeneity and 
existence of outliers. For example, CART can allow finding differences in hedging 
determinants between small and large companies, rather than mix the two together like other 
methods do. The algorithm takes all variables as input, unlike the logit method,  and 
determines which provide best classification criteria. Estimated trees can then be tested using 
predictions for other periods or samples. I computed separate models for each of the three 
periods and then cross-verified. The following models were computed using rpart library. 
There is one methodological note to be made here. CART models take one set of 
arbitrary parameters – cost of misclassification matrix – which can potentially influence the 
results. By default the matrix is set to equal costs for all errors. However, in this study I was 
interested in identifying hedgers, and it could be argued that there are some companies that 
don't hedge even though they do exhibit all the determining factors. This could warrant 
skewing the costs to low cost of false positive classification. I attempted recalculating the 
models using various settings of these costs. The results showed little improvement in 
accuracy, while the number of wrong positives rose dramatically. Consequently, I decided to 
use equal costs. 
The algorithm produced quite different trees in the three periods, however two 
variables were used in all of them: sales (proxy for size) and industry. On top of that, in 2001 
tax charge was used, in 2002 times interest earned ratio and exposure to EUR/PLN rate, 
while in 2003 it was volatility of stock price. Cross-verification results varied between 30% 
and 51% accuracy, and were consistently above the proportion of hedgers in the sample, 
which is the threshold above which we can say the algorithm produces significant results. 
The CART method failed totally however in distinguishing new-hedgers from non-hedgers, 
which was not a surprise, considering results of previous analyses. 
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Fig. 1. Classification tree for hedgers (Y) vs. non-hedgers (N) based on 2002 data (industry1 
stands for construction, timber products, machinery, energy, trade, IT, media, metal, clothing 
and services; industry2 stands for chemical, machinery, trade and food).
Fig. 2. Classification tree for hedgers (Y) vs. non-hedgers (N) based on 2003 data (industry3 
stands for construction, machinery, trade, IT, construction materials, clothing, food, telecom, 
services and 'other')
Fig. 3. Classification tree for hedgers (Y) vs. non-hedgers (N)on 2002 data, without  
INDUSTRY variable
Y
N Y
N YN
SALES<5e+5 SALES>5e+5
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Y
Y
Y
N
SALES<1.5e+5 SALES>1.5e+5
SAELS<1.2e+6 SALES>1.2e+6
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VOL>0.0354VOL<0.0354
SALES>2.68e+5SALES<2.68e+5
N
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CURR<0.1078 CURR>0.1078
MTBV<0.6311 MTBV>0.6311
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Before interpreting the results, I first decided to drop the 2001 tree, which had lowest 
forecast accuracy (30%). The 2002 tree (accuracy of 39% for 2001 data and 51% for 2003, 
with false positives 23% and 22% of non-hedgers) used the industry variable twice: it was the 
criterion for selecting large companies that did hedge, and smaller companies that did not 
hedge. The other smaller companies were classified as hedgers if they had higher exposure to 
EUR/PLN rate or a very high level of times interest earned ratio (above 5.43). Although high 
exposure to exchange rate risk could be a determining factor, provided hedging does not 
remove it, the interest coverage was a surprise. It seems that hedgers were highly liquid and 
had no problems servicing their debt, which is contrary to hypotheses 1f and 1g. 
The 2003 tree (accuracy of 43% and 44%, false positives 20% and 17%) started by 
classifying all companies with sales lower than 150.881 million PLN as non-hedgers, while 
all companies larger than 1.2 billion PLN were classified as hedgers. Of the ones in between 
the industry determined classification of hedgers in the first step, while other companies were 
classified as hedgers only if they had low volatility of stock price (below 0.0354) and sales 
higher than 268 million PLN. 
To refine the decision trees I decided to compute them again without the industry 
variable. Although this variable was indicated by new institutional economics as a possibly 
determining factor (3a), there was a risk, that results are influenced by low number of 
companies in some sectors (Table 2). The new trees were quite different from the previous 
ones, but maintained the same level of accuracy. I discarded the 2003 tree, because it was too 
branched, which made interpretation difficult, and achieved lower accuracy (39% and 41% 
positive hits, 21% and 11% false positives) than the 2002  tree (48% and 53%, with 19% and 
29% false positives). The 2002 tree took two new variables: total foreign currency assets and 
liabilities, and market-to-book value. Among smaller companies hedgers were identified as 
having MTBV ratio above 1.689 – result in line with hypotheses 1j and 4b. Large companies 
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were classified as hedgers if they had total currency assets and liabilities of above 10.78% of 
annual sales or MTBV above 0.6311. The first criterion is definitely logical, as it indicates 
greater exposure, while the second is again in support of theory. Although it has to be noted, 
that MTBV below one cannot be referred to as high. 
Results of all analyses were verified by computing the tests again on a random sample 
of 30 companies for the years 2004 and 2005. Tests of means and medians produced similar 
results in terms of the signs of difference, though fewer variables showed statistically 
significant differences. This was to be expected in a smaller sample, and thus I accepted 
consistent signs of difference as supporting evidence. Tests of medians produced no 
significant differences at all. Hotelling's test for hypotheses 1a, 1d, 1h and 1j of financial 
economics confirmed significant difference. The other set of financial hypothesis could not 
be tested due to covariance matrix singularity. The test for agency theory's hypotheses 2a and 
2b showed no significance. Analysis of variance tests confirmed previous results, however 
industry and ownership hypotheses could not be verified due to low number of observations 
in groups. 
Predictions for 2004 and 2005 of logit models that produced significant results were 
accurate at 46%-62% level with false positives ratio ranging between 14% and 31%. As in 
previous tests, it was the pooled-variables model that attained best results. CART decision 
trees maintained their level of accuracy in predictions. The 2002 and 2003 trees with industry 
variables correctly identified between one third and 44% of hedgers with 0%-23% of false 
positives. The refined 2002 tree achieved accuracy of 55% and 57%, though the number of 
false positives was high: 44% and 22% respectively.
Discussion
Results described above clearly show that only selected few of the determinants 
indicated by the theories were supported by the data. Out of all financial economics 
Risk Management Theory 26
hypotheses I found evidence for only 1a (lower volatility) and 1j (growth options) 
hypotheses. None of agency theory hypotheses proved helpful in identifying determinants of 
hedging. The two new approaches, stakeholder and new institutional economics, which were 
tested here did provide some potentially useful insights: hypotheses 3a (industry factors), 4a 
(IT and services sector), and 4b (intangible assets) were positively verified. In addition I 
found that three variables were significant as well: size of the company (+),  exposure to 
EUR/PLN rate (+), and foreign currency assets and liabilities as percentage of sales (+). 
Finally, my attempts to verify determinants of starting hedging failed, and therefore provide 
no basis for discussion.
A closer look at the hypotheses which were positively verified makes it apparent that 
hypotheses 4b and 1j were tested using the same variable – market-to-book value. Although I 
tried to verify hypothesis 1j using two other variables: R&D expenditure and capital 
expenditure, none of these proved significant and both had negative coefficients in logit 
models. Hence, a question arises if the significance of MTBV variable supports the internal 
financing hypothesis 1j, or intangible assets hypothesis 4b. The insignificance of other 
measures of growth options and evidence provided in other studies in support of costs of 
financial distress (Judge, 2006) hypotheses seem to point to the latter hypothesis. 
The conclusion of low empirical verification of the theories may be questioned on 
methodological grounds. In fact, there is a number of problems in empirical analysis of risk 
management. Firstly, it may be argued that the sample does not allow generalisations. 
However, this argument does not stand to closer inspection. The discipline of economics 
assumes that all people and organisations are, at least limitedly, rational, no matter in which 
market they act. With the exception of new institutional economics, none of the theories 
under investigation make any inferences as to cultural or country differences. Moreover, 
results match those from previous studies surveyed in the second section of this paper. 
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Secondly, cross-industry sample studies suffer from endogeneity issues (Jin, Jorion, 
2006). We can never be sure that a significant correlation is not in fact spurious, related to a 
third factor. For this reason I included dynamic hypotheses and tested for determinants of 
starting hedging in my study, following Guay (1999), although without significant results. I 
also included industry variables, which proved to be significant.
Thirdly, the reader might question, why I did not use panel regression in logit 
estimation, rather then estimate separate models for each year. There were two reasons for 
this. Firstly, ANOVA tests showed no significant difference in hedging activity between the 
periods. Secondly, I wanted to cross-verify results by running predictions from the estimated 
equations on the rest of data, as exhibited in table 6.
Finally, the very concept of negative or low verification may be called into question. 
After all most studies focus on finding empirical support for theories, and either succeed or 
not, without drawing conclusions as to the usefulness of tested theories. This problem has 
been extensively discussed in the past, with arguments ranging from popperian falsification 
(Popper, 1959), to neo-classical non-falsification (e.g. Machlup, 1967). My position on this 
issue is that although we need to be careful before we discard a theory, critical testing of 
theories and their assumptions is essential to research progress. This study does not stand 
alone in exhibiting the shortcomings of present theories, but has been preceded by over a 
decade of empirical research which points clearly to low verification of theories in question. 
Moreover, the aim of this study is not to suggest discarding the theories but to bring the 
theories together, test them in a systematic fashion and identify possibilities for further 
conceptual research in this area.
Conclusion
 This paper investigated main theories of risk management: financial economics, 
agency theory, stakeholder theory and new institutional economics. Results have shown that 
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financial economics and agency theory hypothesis found little supporting evidence, while the 
two recent approaches, stakeholder and NEI may be offering new insights into the 
determinants of risk management. The poor results clearly indicate that there must be other 
significant factors, not included in present theories. Further research will be needed to 
identify these factors, and later incorporate them into a comprehensive theoretical model 
which will explain risk management practices of firms better. 
Results point to practical considerations as main determinants of risk management: 
firms were found to be hedging in response to foreign currency exposure, and it was mostly 
large firms. This implies that managers considering implementation of financial risk 
management should first look at their direct exposures,and consider what other companies in 
the market are doing rather than analyse the problem along the lines of theory. 
Future research may focus on these practical reasons and their implications for 
corporate value. On the other hand, hedging is linked to stock volatility and market value. 
The question remains as to the causal relationship between this variables. There is a needed to 
depart from the eclectic approach to risk management theory and attempt construction of a 
new, comprehensive theoretical model, which would cover all of the empirically identified 
determinants of risk management.
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